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Abstract
We study how excessive debt-GDP ratios a¤ect political sustainability of prudent scal
policy in country members of a monetary union. We develop a model with free choice
of distinct rent-seeking groups to cooperate (or not) in providing public goods, in seeking
rents, and in austere debt issuing through international markets. Noncooperation of rent-
seeking groups on scal prudence triggers collective scal impatience: scal debt is issued
excessively because each group expropriates extra rents before other groups do so, too.
Such collective scal impatience leads to a vicious circle of high international interest rates
and external-debt default. Our calibration suggests that debt-GDP ratios below 137% foster
cooperation among rent-seeking groups, which avoids collective scal impatience and default.
Our analysis helps in understanding the politicoeconomic sustainability of sovereign rescue
packages, emphasizing the need for scal targets and for possible debt haircuts.
Keywords: sovereign debt, rent seeking, world interest rates, international lending,
incentive compatibility, tragedy of the commons, EU crisis
JEL classication: H63, F34, F36, G01, E44, E43, D72
1. Introduction
The Maastricht treaty has been explicit about two scal requirements in order to justify
participation in the Eurozone: (i) that the scal decit-GDP ratio never exceeds 3%, and
(ii) that the scal debt-GDP ratio never exceeds 60%. Here we investigate whether such
scal rules go beyond narrow-minded economic accounting. Specically, we examine whether
quotas on scal debt-GDP ratios guarantee the political feasibility of scal prudence once a
country is already member of a monetary union.
As Figure 1 indicates, corruption and scal proigacy correlate strongly across Eurozone
countries, and corruption is particularly acute in the EU periphery.1 The channel we explore
is whether outstanding debt-GDP ratios a¤ect the practices of well-organized groups within
partisan politics that seek scal rents. In particular, we investigate whether debt-GDP ratios
provide incentives to rent-seeking groups to cooperate (or not) in order to comply with scal-
prudence practices. Our emphasis on such cooperation decisions is corroborated by excerpts
of IMF country reports (see Appendix A), which refer to Eurozone countries that either
received rescue packages or faced high 10-year bond spreads during the sovereign crisis.
IMF monitoring experts explicitly state the need for coalition governments or for partisan
cooperation in order to implement programs of controlled scal spending. Our model seeks
to understand which economic fundamentals make such partisan cooperation possible and
politically sustainable, with special emphasis on the role of debt-GDP ratios.
Table 1 shows why debt-GDP ratios may a¤ect incentives for cooperation on prudent
policies. In Table 1, the cooperation strategy is denoted by Cand the no-cooperation
strategy by NC. If V Ci > V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g, i.e., if cooperation is more rewarding for
1 The correlation coe¢ cient between scal surplus/decit-GDP ratios and the corruption perception index
is 73%. Grechyna (2012) reports similar correlation results to this depicted by Figure 1, referring to OECD
countries.
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both players, then there are two Nash equilibria, namely, (C;C) and (NC;NC). If, instead,
V Ci < V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g, i.e., if noncooperation is more rewarding for both players, then
there are three Nash equilibria, (NC;NC), (C;NC) and (NC;C). Yet, in this second case,
no cooperation is a sure outcome. Levels of debt-GDP ratios a¤ect cooperation decisions
because cooperation on scal prudence involves a high cost of servicing the outstanding
debt. So, if debt-GDP levels are high, then, noncooperation among rent seekers, followed by
default, may be more protable for each rent-seeking group, even if default has long-term
negative consequences. As the cooperation game in Table 1 shows, if the debt-GDP ratio
implies lower values of cooperation for rent-seeking groups, then any chance for cooperation
vanishes.
Player 2
C NC
Player C
 
V C1 ; V
C
2
  
V NC1 ; V
NC
2

1 NC
 
V NC1 ; V
NC
2
  
V NC1 ; V
NC
2

Table 1
Our model seeks to understand which economic fundamentals shape the values of V Ci and
V NCi , i 2 f1; 2g, in games of the form given by Table 1, so as to uncover the determinants of
threshold debt-GDP ratios that encourage political cooperation on scal prudence. To this
end, we introduce the mechanism explained by the game of Table 1 in a dynamic environ-
ment with three modeling features: (i) sovereign bond rates are determined in international
capital markets, (ii) rent-seeking groups jointly inuence debt dynamics, government spend-
ing, and taxes, and, (iii) sovereign defaults happen because, under certain circumstances,
international bond rates become prohibitively high and governments are unable or unwilling
to pay.
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In our model, the mechanism that gives rise to a vicious circle of high interest rates and
default is the emergence of a commons problem, similar to tragedy-of-the-commons prob-
lems arising in renewable-resource conservation analysis. If two or more rent-seeking groups
decide to not cooperate forever, then there is excessive debt issuing, a form of endogenous
scal impatience. Collective impatience appears because noncooperating rent-seeking groups
exploit additional resources earlier, before other groups do so as well. The higher the num-
ber of rent-seeking groups the higher the collective impatience. This impatience causes a
mismatch between creditors and a government: the rate of time preference of creditors is
lower than that of the borrowing government. This mismatch leads to high interest rates and
immediate sovereign default. Our model also implies that after such a default the creditors
never lend to the impatient government again.
A calibration exercise indicates that, if there are only two rent-seeking groups, then,
above a cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio of about 137%, rent-seeking groups prefer to not cooperate,
to default, and to never borrow from external creditors again. Extracting noncooperative
rents from balanced budgets becomes preferable beyond 137%, since noncooperative rents
under scal autarky will be higher compared to shared cooperative rents minus the servicing
cost of a high debt.
Insights on the determinants of such debt-GDP-ratio cutto¤ levels help in understanding
the design of bailout rescue packages.2 A binding commitment for a haircut tries to exclude
an equilibrium in which rent-seeking groups would want to swing to noncooperation even
for one period. Securing that debt-GDP ratios stay below such cuto¤ levels may contribute
to the politicoeconomic sustainability of debt. We also nd that international agreements
(among foreign governments or by the IMF) to roll over scal debt using lower pre-agreed
2 In our Online Appendix we provide evidence on observations motivating us to suggest that corruption and
rent-seeking, as endemic problems in Eurozone periphery countries, play a central role as both causes and
e¤ects within the vicious circle of the Eurozone sovereign crisis.
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interest rates increase the debt-GDP-ratio cuto¤s that support cooperation. So, lower in-
terest rates foster political cooperation among rent-seeking groups, making rescue packages
politically feasible even at high outstanding debt-GDP ratios.3
Related literature includes Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), who study government borrow-
ing in a dynamic setting, and show that lenders taking into account the cost and benet
of default by the governmentimpose debt ceilings on governments. Cole and Kehoe (2000)
study debt crisis that arise from a loss of condence on governmentsability to roll over
scal debt. Conesa and Kehoe (2012), extend Cole and Kehoe (2000) by introducing in-
centives for governments to default or not, gambling on the possibility of recovery of scal
revenues. Arellano (2008) extends Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) by modelling endogenous
default risk. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) stress the importance of the stability and growth
pact of the EU for the control of ination, emphasizing a scal externality imposed on all
countries in a monetary union. This externality is created by shortsighted policy makers
who issue excessive debt in anticipation of loosing o¢ ce. Roch and Uhlig (2011) combin-
ing the insights of Cole and Kehoe (2000), Arellano (2008) and Beetsma and Uhlig (1999),
characterize debt dynamics and study bailouts of troubled countries. Yue (2010) introduces
debt renegotiation after a default to rationalize the levels of debt reduction in emerging
economies observed in the data. Our paper di¤ers from all the above in that we focus on
the political-economic aspects of sovereign debt. We do so from a new angle that we believe
captures important features of scal policy making in the EU periphery countries. Finally,
our rent-seeking mechanism reminds of the one used in Tornell and Lane (1999), yet we do
not have endogenous growth or international trade of productive capital in our model, as we
3 High interest rates make the servicing burden of new debt socially unsustainable as it implies higher
taxes and/or lower public consumption, reducing welfare. Our models mechanics are compatible with these
features, which perhaps explain the stated rationale behind bailouts: the need to make the servicing costs of
debt socially and politically bearable. Indeed, one feature of bailout plans in the EU is the tool of lowering
interest rates.
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focus on sovereign debt, introducing the option of cooperation among rent seekers.
2. Model
2.1 The domestic economy
2.1.1 Production
The domestic economy is populated by a large number of identical innitely-lived agents
of total mass equal to 1. A single composite consumable good is produced under perfect
competition, using labor as its only input through the linear technology,
yt = zt  lt , (1)
in which y is units of output, l is labor hours, and z is productivity. Assume that there is no
uncertainty and that productivity at time 0 is z0 > 0, growing exogenously at rate , i.e.,
zt = (1 + )
tz0 . (2)
2.1.2 Non rent-seeking households
A representative non rent-seeking household (one among a large number of such households)
draws utility from private consumption, c, leisure, 1  l (a households time endowment per
period is equal to 1), and also from the consumption of a public good, G, maximizing the
life-time utility function
1X
t=0
t [ln (ct) + l ln (1  lt) + G ln (Gt)] , (3)
in which  2 (0; 1) is the utility discount factor, while l; G > 0 are the weights on leisure
and public consumption, G, in the utility function. Public consumption is nanced via both
income taxes and scal debt. Yet, for simplicity, we assume that agents in this economy
cannot hold any government bonds, so scal debt is external in all periods. Finally, we
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assume that agents cannot have access to domestic government bonds in the future, and
that there is no storage technology. Under these assumptions, the budget constraint of an
individual household is,
ct = (1   t) ztlt . (4)
The representative non-rent-seeking household maximizes its lifetime utility given by (3),
subject to equation (4), by choosing the optimal stream of consumption and labor supply
throughout the innite horizon, (f(ct; lt)g1t=0), subject to any given stream of tax rates and
public-good quantities, f(Gt;  t)g1t=0. Since the solution to this problem is based on intra-
temporal conditions only, we obtain a simple formula, namely,
lt =
1
1 + l
= L , t = 0; 1; ::: , (5)
with L being both the individual and the aggregate labor supply. That labor supply does
not respond to changes in marginal tax rates is due to using logarithmic utility. Under
logarithmic utility the income and substitution e¤ects of taxation on leisure cancel each
other out.
2.1.3 Rent-seeking groups and rent-seeking households
We introduce N rent-seeking groups in the domestic economy. These groups have the power
to expropriate resources from the scal budget. In each period t 2 f0; 1; :::g, a rent-seeking
group j 2 f1; :::; Ng manages to extract a total rent of size CRj;t. While total population in
the economy has normalized size 1, the population mass of each rent-seeking group is j
with
PN
j=1 j < 1. In each rent seeking group there is a large number of individuals, with
each individual being unable to inuence the groups aggregate actions. Let all households
participating in a rent-seeking group j be identical within the group for all j 2 f1; :::; Ng,
and having equal shares of private individual rents, cRj;t.
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We assume that consumption, cRj;t, due to participation in a rent-seeking group is a
di¤erentiated good from the typical consumer basket intended for private consumption, c.
Units of cRj;t correspond to various in-kind private benets specic to rent-seeking unions, for
example, subsidies for gasoline, housing benets, etc.
An individual rent seeker who is a member of j 2 f1; :::; Ng does not control the level of
consumption cRj;t that she obtains from the group through any form of private e¤ort or cost.
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So, the utility function of this individual rent-seeker of group j is,
1X
t=0
t

ln(cj;t) + l ln(1  lj;t) + G ln(Gt) + R ln
 
cRj;t

, (6)
with R > 0, and her economic problem is maximizing (6) subject to the budget constraint
cj;t = (1   t) ztlj;t . (7)
Optimal choices for a rent seeker are given by,
lj;t = lt =
1
1 + l
= L , t = 0; 1; ::: . (8)
Since labor supply is identical across rent seekers and non rent seekers, private consumption
is also the same across rent seekers and non rent seekers, namely,
cj;t = ct = (1   t) ztL . (9)
2.1.4 Aggregate production and scal budget
Combining L with (1) and (2) gives the competitive-equilibrium GDP level,
Yt = (1 + )
t z0L . (10)
4 We assume that even if rent-seeking groups have to lobby, this is a costless collective action: it requires
no individual e¤ort or any other sacrice.
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For simplicity, we assume that the domestic government issues only one-period zero coupon
bonds. So, in every period there is a need for full debt rollover to the next period.5 The
governments budget constraint is,
Bt+1
1 + rt+1
= Bt +Gt +
NX
j=1
CRj;t    tYt , (11)
in which Yt is aggregate production in period t, Bt+1 is the value of newly issued bonds in
period t that mature in period t + 1, evaluated in terms of the consumable good in period
t + 1, and rt+1 is the interest rate which reects the intrinsic return of a bond maturing
in period t + 1. Assuming that the one-year zero-coupon bond delivers one unit of the
consumable good at maturity, Bt reects the quantity of bonds maturing in period t. In
(11) we have also assumed that the price per unit of cRj;t equals the consumer-basket price.
2.1.5 Impact of tax rates on GDP performance versus impact of
tax rates on welfare
The absence of any marginal tax rates in equation (10) demonstrates that our logarithmic-
utility setup neutralizes the impact of taxes on GDP performance and rules out dynamic
La¤er curves. While taxes do not a¤ect GDP performance, they directly reduce consumption
and utility (see equation (4)). So, taxes have a profound impact on welfare. Also, despite
that taxes do not have the classic distortionary e¤ects on GDP performance, our analysis
does not rule out considerations about an economys ability to repay scal debt. As it will
be clear later, international interest rates at which a country borrows externally inuence
its ability to repay scal debt in the future. It is an analytical advantage that our model
clearly distinguishes the impact of interest-rate pressure on the ability to repay from other
factors a¤ecting GDP performance.
5 This assumption of issuing exclusively one-year zero-coupon bonds rules out concerns about strategic
supply of bonds with di¤erent maturity. The short maturity time of bonds does not a¤ect our qualitative
results.
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2.1.6 Policy-setting mechanism
The levels of scal spending, Gt, the tax rate,  t, and the level of debt one period ahead
Bt+1, are the Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game among rent-seeking groups, which also
determines its extracted rents in each period. There is no explicit majority voting on these
policy variables, assuming that all existing rent-seeking groups actively and simultaneously
inuence policy making in each period. We do not model alternating political parties and as-
sociated rent-seeking groups in power, as this would complicate the derivation of equilibrium
without adding insights to the model. Having all rent-seeking groups acting simultaneously
conveys the mechanics of a commons problem adequately: a rent-seeking group tends to
expropriate extra rents before other groups do so as well. The qualitative equivalence of
asynchronous scal proigacy to a commons problem with simultaneous moves is demon-
strated by Persson and Svensson (1989).
In addition, there is no within-type heterogeneity across rent seekers and non-rent seekers.
We assume that rent-seekers have established their political inuence which has become a
structural feature of policy making.
2.1.7 Policy setting with exogenous interest rates and without the
option of cooperation
If rent-seeking groups were not present, a social planner would set policies so as to maximize
the utility of a representative non-rent-seeking household.6 Such a policy-setting concept,
based on maximizing social welfare, would reect the need of political support for any pro-
posed policies. In the presence of rent-seeking groups, scal policy is set by these rent-seeking
6 Without rent-seeking groups, a social planner would substitute the competitive-equilibrium solution given
by equations (5) and (10) into (3), and would proceed by maximizing the resulting indirect-utility function by
choosing f( t; Bt+1)g1t=0, after having imposed the scal-budget constraint given by (11) and a transversality
condition for scal debt.
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groups, with each group maximizing the groups utility, subject to the rent-seeking behavior
of other rent-seeking groups. In particular, rent-seeking groups compete noncooperatively
with other groups for rents. At the same time, rent-seeking groups ensure that they have
the support of the broader public. In order to gain the support of the broader public, each
rent-seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng maximizes a convex combination of, (i) the sum of indi-
vidual utilities of non rent seekers and, (ii) the groups utility derived by the stream of the
groups consumption

CRj;s
	1
s=t
.
We focus on time-consistent (Markovian) policies and rent-extraction strategies. For an
exogenous stream of international-market interest rates, frsg1s=t+1, the Bellman equation of
rent-seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng is given by,
V^ j

Bt; zt j

CRi
	N
i=1
i6=j
; frsg1s=t+1

= max
( t;CRj;t;Bt+1)
8><>:l ln (1  L) + ln (zt) + ln (1   t)
+G ln
264 Bt+1
1 + rt+1
 
0B@Bt + CRj;t + NX
i=1
i6=j
CRi (Bt; zt j frsg1s=t)   tYt
1CA
375+ R ln  CRj;t
+V^ j

Bt+1; (1 + ) zt j

CRi
	N
i=1
i6=j
; frsg1s=t+2
9>=>; , (12)
in which CRi (Bt; zt j frsg1s=t) is the Markov-Perfect rent-extraction strategy of rent-seeking
group i 2 f1; :::; Ng. Given a pre-specied stream of interest rates,
Denition 1 Given a stream of interest rates, frsg1s=t+1, a (Markov-Perfect)
Domestic Equilibrium under No Cooperation (DENC) is a set of strategies,

Ci;R
	N
i=1
of the form CRi;t = CRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

and a set of policy decision rules fT;Bg
of the form  t = T
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

and Bt+1 = B
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

, such
that each and every rent seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng maximizes (12) subject to
fT;Bg, and CRi 	i6=j.
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We assume symmetry in political inuence and size of groups, namely,
j =  for all j 2 f1; :::; Ng . (13)
2.1.8 Exact Domestic Noncooperative solution
Proposition 1 summarizes the rent-seeking political equilibrium for a given set of interest
rates.
Proposition 1 For all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, given a stream of interest rates, frsg1s=t+1,
there exists a symmetric DENC given by,
Gt
Yt
=
(1  ) G
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R
26664 ztW
 frsg1s=t+1
Yt| {z }
Economys worth/GDP
  Bt
Yt|{z}
Fiscal debt/GDP
37775 ,
(14)
in which
W
 frsg1s=t+1 =
2664 1Y
s=t+1
1
1 + ~rs
+ 1 +
1X
s=t+1
1
sQ
j=t+1
(1 + ~rj)
3775  L , (15)
with
1 + ~rt  1 + rt
1 + 
,
while
 t = T
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

= 1  1
G
Gt
Yt
, (16)
CRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

= CR
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

=
=
(1  ) R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R 

ztW
 frsg1s=t+1 Bt| {z }
Economys net worth
, (17)
for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng, while,
Bt+1
Yt+1
=
B
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

Yt+1
=
11
=
1 + rt+1
1 + 
"
N
Bt
Yt
+ (1  N)
ztW
 frsg1s=t+1
Yt
  1
#
, (18)
with
N =
1 + G + R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R , (19)
Proof See Appendix B. 
2.1.9 International interest rates, chosen policies, and the ability
to repay sovereign debt
Equation (14) is intuitive. Notice that @W
 frsg1s=t+1 =@rs < 0 for all s  t+ 1 and all t 2
f0; 1; :::g, according to equation (15). This reduction in economys worth (ztW
 frsg1s=t+1 =Yt)
which occurs due to the increase in any future periods interest rate, a¤ects all policies. Any
interest-rate increase reduces Gt=Yt (see (14)), it increases tax rates (see (16)), and it also
reduces rents (see (17)). Most importantly, any interest-rate increase reduces the economys
ability to repay sovereign debt through collecting taxes.
The role of increasing the debt-GDP ratio is exactly the same as an interest-rate increase.
The term Bt=Yt in equations (18), (14), (16), and (17), reveals that future taxes must pay
back the outstanding sovereign debt-GDP ratio, which also contributes to reducing Gt=Yt
and rents, and to increasing tax rates.
2.1.10 Postponed scal prudence and the number of rent-seeking
groups: scal impatience due to a commons problem
Equation (18) conveys the presence of scal prudence in this model. Next periods op-
timal debt-GDP ratio decreases if future interest rates are foreseen to increase. Since
@W
 frsg1s=t+1 =@rs < 0 for all s  t+1, equation (18) implies that next periods debt-GDP
ratio falls, because of the foreseen increase in rolling over debt issued in the future.
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Policy setting by multiple noncooperating rent-seeking groups has a profound e¤ect on
postponing scal prudence. Since W
 frsg1s=t+1 is multiplied by the factor (1  N), and
@ (1  N) =@N > 0 (see equation (19)), an increase in the number of rent-seeking groups
strengthens the scal-prudence-postponement characteristic. Postponement of scal pru-
dence stems from two opposing forces. On the one hand, rent-seeking groups want to con-
serve the scal budget, in order to be able to extract more in the future. So, they exhibit
scal prudence by having the optimal next periods debt-GDP ratio strategy depending pos-
itively on the term W
 frsg1s=t+1 with @W  frsg1s=t+1 =@rs < 0 for all s  t + 1. On the
other hand, as the number of rent-seeking groups increases, scal debt is issued excessively
today, as is revealed by equation (17): after calculating aggregate rents,
NX
i=1
CRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

= N CR  Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1
=
N  (1  ) R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R| {z }
(N)
 ztW  frsg1s=t+1 Bt| {z }
Economys net worth
(20)
we notice that the fraction of economys net worth expropriated by all rent-seeking groups
is increasing in the number of (symmetric) groups (0 (N) > 0 in equation (20)). Aggregate
rents increase in the number of rent-seeking groups because each noncooperating rent-seeking
group expropriates additional rents before other groups do so, too. This e¤ect, driven by
0 (N) > 0, leads to collective scal impatience across rent-seeking groups that do not
cooperate, describing a classic commons problem, in a similar fashion to problems of resource
conservation. This commons problem dominates, and leads to scal-prudence postponement.
Yet, this dynamic game has another set of players, the external creditors. Fiscal-prudence
postponement due to an increase in the number of noncooperating rent-seeking groups is a
central reason why external creditors may require extra compensation through suggesting
higher interest rates in order to roll scal debt over to the next period. This mechanism is
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claried after putting supply and demand together in the bonds market in order to determine
international interest rates.
2.2 The external creditors
We denote all external-creditor variables using a star. For simplicity, assume that external
creditors only hold bonds from one country, and maximize their total life-time utility derived
from consumption,
1X
s=t
(s t) ln (cs) (21)
subject to the budget constraint,7
Bs+1 = (1 + rs+1) (B

s   cs) . (23)
Notice that the rate of time preference, (1  ) =, in the utility function of creditors, (21),
is equal to the rate of time preference of domestic households.
The solution to the problem of maximizing (21) subject to (23) is,
ct = (1  )Bt cs = (1  ) (s t)
sY
i=t+1
(1 + ri)B

s , s = t+ 1; t+ 2; ::: ,
which implies,
Bt+1 =  (1 + rt+1)B

t . (24)
7 Notice that in case creditors held bonds fromM di¤erent countries, the budget constraint given by equation
(23) would be, instead,
MX
j=1
Bj;s+1
1 + rj;s+1
=
MX
j=1
Bj;s   cs , s = t; t+ 1; ::: , (22)
in which Bj;s is the outstanding debt of country j 2 f1; :::;Mg and rj;s+1 is the interest rate that markets
give to country js debt. The interior solution to maximizing (21) subject to (22) is characterized by
cs+1=c

s =  (1 + rj;s+1), which implies that the interest rate is the same across all countries (rj;s+1 = ri;s+1
for all i; j 2 f1; :::;Mg). All crucial features of the demand function and the implied interest rates for
any specic country j 2 f1; :::;Mg resulting from maximizing (21) subject to (22) are not a¤ected by the
presence of other countries. For simplicity we assume that there is only one country with external scal
debt. Evidently, the budget constraint given by (23) is a special case of (22) for M = 1.
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Equation (24) determines the demand for bonds by external creditors in period t+1. Loga-
rithmic preferences are responsible for this compact algebraic solution given by (24), which
implies that demand for external debt in period 1 depends only on the return of bonds issued
in period t and maturing in period t+ 1, rt+1.8
2.3 Determining interest-rate levels if rent-seeking groups always
cooperate
We examine the case in which N  2 rent-seeking groups cooperate by forming a single
government coalition comprised by all existing rent-seeking groups in the economy (universal
coalition). Within this universal coalition, rent-seeking groups equally share a total amount
of rents, CRt , with each group receiving C
R
t =N in each period. We derive the supply of bonds
decided by such a coalition and we equate it to the demand for bonds by external creditors
in order to calculate international interest rates.
The Bellman equation of rent-seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng under cooperation is given by,
V C;j (Bt; zt) = max
( t;CRt ;Bt+1)
8><>:l ln (1  L) + ln (zt) + ln (1   t)
+ G ln

Bt+1
1 +RC (Bt; zt)
   Bt + CRt    tYt + R lnCRtN

+V C;j (Bt+1; (1 + ) zt)
9>=>; , (25)
8 Without logarithmic utility, the typical decision rule determining the demand of bonds in period 1 is of
the form Bt+1 = h
 frsg1s=t+1 ; Bt , i.e., it depends on all future interest rates, frsg1s=t+1. In the special case
of logarithmic utility, h is of the more restricted form h
 frsg1s=t+1 ; Bt  = ~h (rt+1; Bt ) =  (1 + rt+1)Bt .
That ~h (rt+1; Bt ) is independent from any interest-rate changes in the continuation stream frsg1s=t+2 does
not mean that creditors with logarithmic preferences are not forward-looking any more. It is that income-
and substitution e¤ects on consumption/savings cancel each other out one-to-one, for all future transition
paths under logarithmic utility. So, under (21), the e¤ects of any continuation stream frsg1s=t+2 only reect
the impact of the constant rate of time preference on current decisions, through the presence of the discount
factor, , in ~h (rt+1; Bt ) =  (1 + rt+1)B

t .
15
in which the interest-rate rule, rt+1 = RC (Bt; zt), is determined by equating supply and
demand in the international market for bonds. Due to the symmetry of rent-seeking groups
there is unanimity within the universal coalition, with the values driving all decisions, 
 t; C
R
t ; Bt+1; Gt

, corresponding to the value function V C;j (Bt; zt) of (25). Denition 2
species international-market equilibrium under cooperation of rent-seeking groups.
Denition 2 An International Equilibrium under Cooperation (IEC) is a set
of strategies, CR;C of the form CR;Ct = CR;C (Bt; zt) and a set of policy deci-
sion rules

TC ;GC ;BC
	
of the form  t = TC (Bt; zt), Gt = GC (Bt; zt), and
Bt+1 = BC (Bt; zt), a bond-demand strategy of creditors, Bt+1 = B (Bt; zt), and
an interest-rate rule, RC (Bt; zt), such that

TC ;BC ;CR;C ;GC
	
guarantee that
each and every rent seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng maximizes (25), subject to rule
RC (Bt; zt), creditorsBcomplies with equation (24), and with RC (Bt; zt) = rt+1
satisfying BC (Bt; zt) = B (Bt; zt), for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
2.3.1 Exact International Cooperative solution
Proposition 2 characterizes the rent-seeking political equilibrium under cooperation among
rent-seeking groups (IEC).
Proposition 2 For all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, the IEC interest rates are constant,
given by,
RC (Bt; zt) = r
ss =
1 + 

  1 , t = 0; 1; ::: , (26)
the debt-GDP ratio remains constant over time,
BC (Bt; zt)
Yt
=
Bt
Yt
 bCt = b0 
B0
Y0
, t = 0; 1; ::: , (27)
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the public-consumption-to-GDP ratio, the rents-to-GDP ratio and the tax rate,
all remain constant over time, with,
GC (Bt; zt)
Yt
 gCt = gC =
(1  ) G
1 + G + R
26664 11  | {z }
Economys worth/GDP
  b0|{z}
Fiscal debt/GDP
37775 , t = 0; 1; ::: ,
(28)
CR;C (Bt; zt)
Yt
=
R
G
gC , and TC (Bt; zt) = Ct = C = 1 
1
G
gC , t = 0; 1; ::: .
(29)
Proof See Appendix B. 
2.4 Determining interest-rate levels if rent-seeking groups never
cooperate
The Bellman equation of rent-seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng under no cooperation is given by,
V NC;j
 
Bt; zt j
n
CR;NCi
oN
i=1
i6=j
!
= max
( t;CRj;t;Bt+1)
8><>:l ln (1  L) + ln (zt) + ln (1   t)
+ G ln
264 Bt+1
1 +RNC (Bt; zt)
 
0B@Bt + CRj;t + NX
i=1
i6=j
CR;NCi (Bt; zt)   tYt
1CA
375
+R ln
 
CRj;t

+ V NC;j
 
Bt+1; (1 + ) zt j
n
CR;NCi
oN
i=1
i6=j
!9>=>; (30)
in which rt+1 = RNC (Bt; zt) is the interest-rate rule. Denition 3 species international-
market equilibrium under noncooperation of rent-seeking groups.
Denition 3 An International Equilibrium under No Cooperation (IENC)
is a set of strategies,
n
CR;NCi
oN
i=1
of the form CR;NCi;t = C
R;NC
i (Bt; zt) and a
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set of policy decision rules

TNC ;GNC ;BNC
	
of the form  t = TNC (Bt; zt),
Gt = GNC (Bt; zt), and Bt+1 = BNC (Bt; zt), a bond-demand strategy of creditors,
Bt+1 = B (Bt; zt), and an interest-rate rule, RNC (Bt; zt), such that

TNC ;BNC ;CR;NC ;GNC
	
guarantee that each and every rent seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng maximizes (30),
subject to rule RNC (Bt; zt) and subject to strategies of other rent-seeking groupsn
CR;NCi
oN
i=1
i6=j
, creditors Bcomplies with equation (24), and with RNC (Bt; zt) =
rt+1 satisfying BNC (Bt; zt) = B (Bt; zt), for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
2.4.1 Exact International Equilibrium Under No Cooperation
Proposition 3 conveys the key feature of our model.
Proposition 3 If N  2, the only possible IENC is immediate full debt
default without return to credit markets again.
Proof See Appendix B. 
The formal proof of Proposition 3 is extensive. Yet, the key behind the default result given
by Proposition 3 is the endogenous impatience mechanics that we have already stressed for
the domestic equilibrium under no cooperation (DENC) through Proposition 1. Specically,
the endogenous factor N , specied by equation (19), which implies @N=@N < 0, causes a
mismatch in the market-clearing equation of external debt. Specically, external creditors
foresee that multiple rent-seeking groups have the tendency to issue debt excessively in all
periods. So, external creditors understand that the domestic economy will be unable to
repay the debt asymptotically. As a result, external creditors suggest to roll over debt at a
sequence of high interest rates that oblige the domestic economy to provide its total worth
to creditors asymptotically. So, the domestic economy can do nothing but default. An
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equivalent way of stating this result: external creditors are unwilling to lend a country in
which e¤ective impatience for debt issuing does not match the rate of time preference of
creditors.
In brief, when N  2, the endogenous-scal-impatience aspect of the commons problem
arising among rent-seeking groups, is responsible for the immediate sovereign default. Fur-
thermore, if this noncooperation among rent-seeking is permanent, then permanent is also
the exit of the domestic economy from external-debt markets.
3. Debt-GDP ratios and participation in a monetary union: im-
plications for rescue packages
Participation in a sustainable monetary union implies that scal debt is paid back in the
common currency. The ability of each member state to issue and sustain external scal
debt is crucial for the sustainability of a banking system in which foreign banks may play
the role of external creditors. While we do not model banks explicitly, we stress that an
international agreement about either, (a) entrance into a monetary union, or (b) a rescue
package for debt rollover of a member state, should guarantee that rent-seeking groups which
tend to act separately, should have incentives to cooperate forever. Here we focus on (b), a
rescue package which aims at a particular agreement: that rent-seeking groups will commit
to a non-default and that they will be cooperating forever, sharing their rents.9
3.1 Two rent-seeking groups andMarkov-perfect-Nash -equilibrium
selection
Even in the one-stage, normal-form game of cooperation decisions, presented by Table 1 in
the Introduction, there are multiple Nash equilibria. If cooperation is less rewarding for both
9 This focus of ours is inspired by the rescue packages of the post-2009 sovereign-debt crisis which emphasized
the target of no defaults, because of fears of domino e¤ectson previously rescued banks.
19
players (V Ci < V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g), then a cooperation outcome is impossible. The only way
to make a cooperation outcome possible is to ensure that cooperation is more rewarding for
both players (V Ci > V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g). Here we show that in a dynamic game, V Ci > V NCi ,
i 2 f1; 2g, hinges on the debt-GDP ratio level.
A dynamic game with innite horizon and a free option to cooperate or not in each
period can have multiple equilibria as well, even if we restrict our attention to Markov-
perfect cooperation-decision Nash equilibria.10 Yet, Propositions 2 and 3, together with
Table 1, illuminate that the strategies according to which two rent-seeking groups either, (i)
cooperate forever, or (ii) never cooperate and default, in which case they keep not cooperating
forever under a balanced scal budget, are both Markov-perfect cooperation-decision Nash
equilibria.11
Lets start examining case (ii) above, i.e., default with no cooperation before and after-
wards. Moving one period ahead after the full default, debt remains 0 forever (see Proposition
3), and the game is not a dynamic game anymore, but similar to the normal-form game of
cooperation decisions, with the sole di¤erence that GDP grows exogenously and sums of
discounted utilities over an innite horizon are computed. After some algebra, we nd that
V C;j (Bt = 0; zt) > V
NC;j
 
Bt = 0; zt j
n
CR;NCi
o2
i=1
i6=j
!
, 1 +  > 2 , (31)
j 2 f1; 2g in which,
  R
1 + G + R
. (32)
By its denition,  2 (0; 1), and it is straightforward to verify that 1 +  > 2 is a true
statement for all  2 (0; 1). So, V C;j (0; zt) > V NC;j (0; zt) for j 2 f1; 2g and all t 2 f1; 2; :::g.
10Denition B.1 in Appendix B states formally the concept of a Markov-perfect cooperation-decision Nash
equilibrium.
11A formal proof of this claim, that strategies (i) and (ii) are both Markov-perfect cooperation-decision
equilibriums, appears in the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix B.
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As we have noticed above for the normal-form game, whenever cooperation is more rewarding
for both players, then there are two Nash equilibria, (C;C) and (NC;NC). So, by the
unimprovability principle (cf. Kreps 1990, pp. 812-813), the strategies described by (ii)
above, no cooperation in period 0, immediate default and no cooperation thereafter forever,
is a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Having established that no cooperation and default is a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
allows us to study a sovereign-debt rescue initiative in a monetary union more formally.
Specically, other member states may consider no cooperation among rent-seeking groups
and sovereign default as being the worst possible outcome in a period that banks are fragile.
The reason is that the magnitude of a full default by a sovereign state may be a big shock for
banks holding external debt in the monetary union.12 In addition, convincing rent-seeking
groups to follow a strategy of cooperation forever, in order to avoid the problems of scal
impatience and scal proigacy is the most desirable outcome. Proposition 4 establishes
that this cooperation equilibrium is a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, and it identies the
debt-to-GDP ratios that make its adoption and enforceability desirable by two rent-seeking
groups.
Proposition 4 If N = 2, then the strategies according to which the two rent-
seeking groups cooperate forever is a Markov-perfect cooperation-decision Nash
equilibrium, which holds if,
V C;j (Bt; zt)  V NC;j
 
Bt = 0; zt j
n
CR;NCi
o2
i=1
i6=j
!
, bt  1
1  

1  2

1 + 

 b ,
(33)
for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, in which  is given by (32).
12We use the example of bank fragility only as motivation for this equilibrium selection. An extension in
which banks are explicitly modeled is beyond the scope of this paper.
21
Proof See Appendix B. 
In Proposition 4 notice the converse of (33): if the debt-GDP ratio is higher than a
threshold level, b, then rent-seeking groups have higher utility by defaulting and not cooper-
ating ever after. This is reasonable, because paying back the debt and cooperating entails a
tradeo¤: on the one hand, rent-seeking groups can divide the coalition rents by two, which
leads to rewards in each period, as (31) reveals; on the other hand, they have to bear the cost
of servicing the debt. The higher the debt-GDP ratio the lower the cooperation benets, so
default strikes as a better option.
3.1.1 Rescue packages and sovereign-debt haircuts
EU rescue packages imply monitoring of the domestic economys rent-seeking groups by other
member states of the monetary union. Monitoring the ability of a government to satisfy the
conditions of a rescue package involves preventing and eliminating excessive rent seeking
by groups that inuence policymaking. This focus on controlling the behavior of partisan
corruption is evident in IMF-report excerpts outlined in Appendix A. Yet, in order to be
proactive, it is reasonable to try to make the rescue deal palatable to the rent-seeking groups
in order to achieve political sustainability and robustness of the rescue-package deal. So, if
bt is larger than the threshold given by (33), b = [1  2= (1 + )] = (1  ), then the rescue-
package deal may involve a sovereign-debt haircut of magnitude 100  (bt   b) percentage
points of the domestic economys GDP.
Another crucial aspect of rescue-package e¤ectiveness is the welfare change for the general
public (non rent seekers). In our model, political outcomes, (Gt,  t, Bt+1), are determined
solely by the Nash-equilibrium decisions of rent-seeking groups. Even after a default that
eliminates the burden of servicing the scal debt, non-rent-seekers prefer that rent-seeking
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groups cooperate. This happens because noncooperation implies higher total rents extracted
by households in the form of higher  , and welfare reduction through lower g  G=Y . Propo-
sition 5 shows that gains from cooperation are substantial for non-rent-seekers. Specically,
even if bt > b, and an exogenous international agreement forces rent-seeking groups to co-
operate without a haircut that reduces bt to b, then non-rent-seekers would benet even
if they had to service the high debt bt > b thereafter. This happens because full default
and non-cooperation would make g to drop. The threshold, b > b, above which servicing
the debt becomes unbearable for non-rent-seekers, making them to (desperately) side with
rent-seekers in favor of default, is substantially higher than b, as the calibration section
shows.
Proposition 5 There exists a cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio,
b =
1
1  

1 + 
, (34)
in which  is given by (32), with b > b, such that, if gC
b^
corresponds to cooper-
ation among rent-seeking groups together with servicing b^ forever, and if gNCdefault
corresponds to full default and noncooperation forever, then,
(i) b^ 2  b;b) gC
b^
> gNCdefault , (35)
(ii) b^ > b) gC
b^
< gNCdefault . (36)
Proof See Appendix B. 
Proposition 5 states that attempts to convince rent-seeking groups to cooperate (see
the relevant IMF-report excerpts in Appendix A) would be welcomed by the general non-
rent-seeking public if the debt-GDP ratio is not too high. So the model demonstrates that
non-rent-seeking households dislike excessive corruption that leads to scal proigacy or to
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defaults, unless the outstanding debt GDP ratios is exceptionally high. In the following
section we calibrate our stylized model in order to give a quantitative sense of b and b.
3.1.2 Calibration
Our benchmark calibration focuses on matching data of the European Union (EU) periphery
countries, since they are at the center of the EU crisis. Our goal is to identify the cuto¤
debt-GDP ratio b. First, we match the total-government-to-GDP spending in these countries
which is an average of approximately 45%.13 In order to nd the target value for the total-
rents-GDP ratio at the cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio b (denoted by cR), we use estimates regarding
the size of the shadow economy as a share of GDP reported by Elgin and Oztunali (2012).
We make a simple projection of these shadow-economy estimates, assuming that these shares
are uniform across the private and the public sector. In other words, the share of rents in
total government spending match the size of the shadow economy as a share of GDP.
CR;C as % of government spending cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio b
28% (EU periphery) 137%
Table 2
In Table 2 we report the cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio, b, corresponding to the 28% rents-to-
total-government spending ratio which is the average shadow economy share in EU-periphery
countries.14 We consider EU-periphery countries as our benchmark, since they are at the
center of the EU crisis. The assumed rate of time preference, (1  ) =, is 2:4%. The 137%
cuto¤ level b provides higher utility to rent-seekers if they cooperate, compared to defaulting.
13Data for G=Y are from the European Central Bank (ECB), Statistical data Warehouse, Government
Finance data (Revenue, Expenditure and decit/surplus), September 2013.
14So, the rents-GDP ratio is 28%  45% = 12:6% in this calibration. In Appendix B we explain how
calibration is achieved in this model. Specically, we prove that calibrating R and G in order to match
target values for the government-consumption-GDP ratio and the total-rents-GDP ratio is independent from
the values of  at the cuto¤ level b.
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This 137% debt-GDP ratio is in the ballpark of targets of the private sector involvement
(PSI)haircut for Greece in the period 2011-2012.15 Perhaps one factor shaping the target
debt-GDP ratio of Greece during the PSI negotiations was the political sustainability of scal
prudence, through convincing distinct rent-seeking groups to cooperate. This cooperation
could be achieved by a coalition government, at least by the two major political parties that
used to alternate in power during the previous four decades.
Finally, we nd that the cuto¤ debt-GDP level b dened by Proposition 5 is 501%.
Beyond b non-rent-seekers would support a default even with the rent-seeking groups not
cooperating and exploiting excessive rents, because servicing the debt becomes too costly.
Perhaps 501% is the cuto¤ level triggering support to social polarization among rent-seeking
groups. Yet, we are not aware of any peace times during which such debt-GDP ratios have
been recorded before a default.
Figure 2 depicts a sensitivity analysis of our benchmark calibration. It shows the relation-
ship between the rate of time preference,  = (1  ) = and the cuto¤ level b. We emphasize
that varying  means simultaneously changing the rate of time preference of both creditors
and of all agents in the domestic economy. As Proposition 2 indicates, under cooperation,
international interest rates remain constant, tracking closely the rate of time preference, .
Thus, a higher  implies higher cost of servicing outstanding debt, decreasing the tolerance
to cooperation versus default. This is evident by Figure 2: at levels of  above 4%, the cuto¤
debt-GDP ratio for cooperation versus default falls below 80%. On the contrary, more pa-
tient creditors and domestic agents (low ), increases the cooperation range, raising b above
160% of GDP for  less than 2%.
15For an extensive review of the Greek sovereign crisis and an outline of PSI see Ardagna and Caselli (2012).
For a study reporting the average haircut values between years 1970-2010, see Cruces and Trebesch (2012).
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The analysis presented by Figure 2 may provide insights regarding the agreed interest
rates of servicing debt under EU rescue packages (Ireland, Greece, Portugal). Since rescue
packages involve long-term e¤ective interest rates, lowering the cost of debt servicing may
provide more political support in countries with corruption, by creating more incentives for
rent-seeking groups to cooperate on scal prudence. The Greek PSI program, which involved
both a reduction in interest rates and a haircut (see Ardagna and Caselli , 2012), has been
followed by political consensus thereafter, providing a good example of this insight.
4. Conclusion
The EU sovereign debt crisis has painfully reminded that sustainability of debt-to-GDP
ratios is of rst order importance for the stability and future course of the monetary union.
Rescue packages were introduced for EU periphery countries. One crucial element and a
challenge behind these packages, stressed by o¢ cial creditors, is the need for cooperation of
political parties, in order to achieve scal prudence. But EU periphery politics are plagued
with rent-seeking activities that overstretch scal budgets.
Our model studied the politics of coalition-making among rent-seeking groups, providing
a key insight. Reaching a high level of external sovereign debt-GDP ratio takes an economy
beyond the perils of mere economic accounting. Beyond some debt-GDP ratio threshold
which depends on the inuence of rent-seeking groups in policymaking, political resistance
to cooperation among rent seekers and parties on prudent policies arises. International
markets respond by charging high interest rates, worsening the debt dynamics and making
default immediately preferable (and unavoidable) by rent seekers. Rent seekers do not want
to service a high outstanding debt, yet their noncooperation triggers the vicious circle of
rapidly worsening terms of borrowing. For economies which are prone to corruption and
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rent-seeking phenomena, the risk of political turmoil makes the requirement of staying within
a safety zone of low debt-GDP ratio tighter.
Our framework has accommodated a number of modeling elements with explicitly dy-
namic policy setting: debt, public consumption, tax rates, and importantly, the free decision
of rent-seeking groups to cooperate or not, are all determined in a sequential manner and
as a function of outstanding sovereign debt. These modeling features help us to understand
what determines cuto¤ debt-GDP ratios which lead to political turmoil and default. The
mechanism triggering the vicious circle of default is a commons problem that leads to a
discrepancy between the rate of time preference of creditors and the collective rate of time
preference of governments that have multiple noncooperating rent-seeking groups. While
commons problems are di¢ cult to resolve, our model points at the importance of keeping
debt-GDP ratios low. The role of debt-GDP ratios should prevail in future extensions of our
model (e.g., with uncertainty and productive capital) which should be easy to accommodate,
given the recursive structure of the dynamic game we have suggested.
Our model suggests that rescue packages may use short-term tools, such as debt haircuts,
or provision of low interest rates in order to convince rent-seeking groups to cooperate and
to service a debt that costs less. Yet, the long-term goal of rescue packages should be to
promote monitoring on reforms that are likely to eradicate rent-seeking groups.
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  Appendix A – Explicit IMF reference to the need for cooperation among political parties on austerity measures 
   Greece  Italy  Portugal  Spain  Ireland 
2012 
IMF Country Report No. 12/57 “staff 
welcomes the commitments from the 
political parties supporting the present 
coalition to continue with the objectives 
and policies of the new program”  (IMF 
2012a, p. 44) 
 
“Structural reforms, which are critical 
to addressing both of these problems, 
lost considerable momentum during 
2011. [ ...] Retaining broad political 
support for reforms will be crucial to 
future success.”  (IMF 2012a, p. 42) 
 
2012 Article IV Consultation with 
Italy- Concluding Statement of 
the IMF Mission: “ With broad 
political support, the authorities 
have embarked on an ambitious 
and wide-ranging agenda that 
has lifted Italy from the brink and 
is now seen as a model for fiscal 
stabilization and growth-
enhancing reforms”.  (IMF 
2012e, p. 1) 
IMF Country Report No. 12/77 “Prospects of 
program success remain reasonably strong, 
given that substantial adjustment and 
significant reforms is already underway and 
there is strong political support”.  (IMF 
2012b, p. 26) 
 
IMF Country Report No. 12/179: “Finally, one 
year into the program, the authorities are 
building a convincing track record of meeting 
adjustment and reform objectives while 
preserving political support, and prospects of 
success for the program remain reasonably 
strong”. (IMF 2012c, pp.19-20) 
 
Transcript of the Updates to 
the World Economic 
Outlook/Global Stability 
Report/Fiscal Monitor Press 
Briefing 01.2012 “Political 
agreement is also needed on 
a medium-term fiscal 
adjustment plan that will first 
stabilize and then bring down 
the debt-to-GDP ratio”. (IMF 
2012f, p. 1) 
IMF Country Report No. 12/264 “Political 
commitment to consolidation has been a welcome 
constant, as reflected in the affirmation by the 
new government (which took office in March 2011) 
of the medium-term fiscal targets in the EU–IMF 
supported program agreed in December 2010”. 
(IMF 2012d, p. 20) 
2011 
 
IMF Country Report No. 11/351: “Staff 
welcomes the creation of a national unity 
government in Greece and the 
endorsement of program objectives and 
policies by the three major political 
parties. The previous lack of broad 
political support for the program in 
Greece has emboldened vested interests 
and has thus contributed directly to the 
slowdown of reform implementation.” 
(IMF 2011f, p. 35) 
IMF Country Report No. 11/173: 
“The authorities’ welcome 
commitment to reduce the fiscal 
deficit to close to zero 
by 2014 needs to be 
accompanied by action. [...]  
The large size of the envisaged 
fiscal retrenchment requires 
structural changes which must 
be designed well in advance. 
This calls for a strong political 
consensus and careful 
planning”.  (IMF 2011c, p. 30) 
IMF Country Report No. 11/279: “Sustained 
social and political support is necessary for 
the comprehensive structural reform 
program. Strong vested interests could 
weaken reforms, or reform fatigue could 
set in, and weaken growth prospects and the 
required adjustment in the economy”. (IMF 
2011e, p. 16) 
IMF Country Report No. 
11/215: “Ambitious fiscal 
consolidation is underway but 
[...] Such a comprehensive 
strategy would be helped by 
broad political and social 
support”. (IMF 2011d, p. 1) 
IMF Country Report No. 11/109: ”the elections 
brought in a coalition government with strong 
ownership of the goals and key elements of the 
EU/IMF-supported program, much reducing these 
risks compared with the time of program approval. 
Yet the capacity to sustain fiscal adjustment and 
other reforms will depend on signs of concrete 
results in time”. [ ...] It is welcome that the new 
government has affirmed their strong commitment to 
the fiscal consolidation agreed in the EU/IMF-
supported program”. (IMF 2011b, pp. 22-23) 
 
IMF Country Report No. 11/47: “Turning market 
sentiment to a more positive tone will require 
sustained implementation and reduced political 
uncertainty”. (IMF 2011a, p. 7) 
 
2010 
IMF Country Report No. 10/110: “The 
large multiyear fiscal and structural 
adjustment requires a decisive break 
from past behavior. Greece has run into 
fiscal problems before, which were often 
resolved only temporarily and by stop-
gap measures. A decisive break now 
requires strong political will and public 
support. Mitigating factors include a 
strong mandate of the governing party 
and measures in the program to protect 
vulnerable groups.”  (IMF 2010b, p. 21) 
 
”The challenge ahead will be to 
implement the program rigorously, while 
securing the necessary public consensus 
for reforms.”  (IMF 2010b, pp. 138-9) 
 
 IMF Country Report No. 10/18: “Political 
support for reform may need broadening. 
The Socialist Party was re-elected in 
September 2009, but lost its overall majority. 
While there seems consensus 
among the main parties to comply with the 
SGP in general, pressure for further stimulus 
is strong”.  (IMF 2010a, p. 9) 
 
IMF Country Report No. 
10/254: “Policies and staff 
views: Ambitious fiscal 
consolidation is underway. [...] 
Such a comprehensive 
strategy, especially with broad 
political and social support, 
would underpin investor 
confidence, and time is of the 
essence”.   (IMF 2010c, p. 1) 
 
IMF Country Report No. 10/366: “Adhering to the 
fiscal targets and restructuring the financial sector 
require strong political will and public support”.   
(IMF 2010d, p. 12) 
 
5. Appendix B Proofs and formal denitions
Proof of Proposition 1 The rst-order conditions of the Bellman-equation problem given
by (12) lead to,
Gt = G  (1   t)  zt  L , (37)
CRj;t =
R
G
Gt = R  (1   t)  zt  L , (38)
and
R
(1 + rt+1)CRj;t
=  
@V^ j

Bt+1; zt+1 j

CR;i
	N
i=1
i6=j
; frsg1s=t+2

@Bt+1
, (39)
together with the scal-budget constraint (11).
In order to identify the value function of the Bellman equation given by (12), its associated
rent-seeking strategies, and the models decision rules, we make two guesses. We rst take
a guess on the functional form of the rent-seeking group consumption strategies, CRi;t =
Ci;R
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

. Specically, in symmetric equilibrium,
Ci;R
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

= R  (ztWt+1  Bt) , for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng , (40)
in which R is an undetermined coe¢ cient, and,
Wt+1 W
 frsg1s=t+1 ,
for notational simplicity, in which W
 frsg1s=t+1 is given by the expression in (15). It can
be veried that the expression in (15) is the solution to the di¤erence equation
Wt+1 =
1 + 
1 + rt+1
Wt+2 + L ; t = 0; 1; ::: , (41)
which is a recursion fully characterizing Wt+1 in the guess given by (40). The second guess
is on the functional form of the value function of player j 2 f1; :::; Ng, in Bellman equation
(12). Specically,
28
V^ j

Bt; zt j

CR;i
	N
i=1
i6=j
; frsg1s=t+1

= + 
1X
s=t
s t ln (1 + rs+1)+ ln (ztWt+1  Bt) , (42)
in which ,  , and , are undetermined coe¢ cients, common across all j 2 f1; :::; Ng, due
to symmetry.
We substitute our guesses (40) and (42) into the Bellman equation given by (12), in
order to verify whether the functional forms given by (40) and (42) are indeed correct, and
also in order to calculate the undetermined coe¢ cients ,  , , and R. Before making this
substitution, a simplifying step is to use a state-variable transformation, namely,
xt  ztWt+1  Bt ,
and to calculate the law of motion of xt, a function xt+1 = X (xt), that is based on (11), the
rst-order conditions (37) through (42), and our guesses (40) and (42).
In order to nd the law of motion xt+1 = X (xt), we rst combine (42) with (39) to
obtain CRj;t = Rxt+1= [ (1 + rt+1)], and then we combine this result with (38), which leads
to,
(1   t)  zt  L| {z }
q
Yt
=
1
 (1 + rt+1)
xt+1 . (43)
From the scal-budget constraint (11) and the recursion given by (41) we obtain,
zt+1Wt+2  Bt+1| {z }
q
xt+1
= (1 + rt+1)
2664ztWt+1  Bt| {z }
q
xt
  (1   t)Yt  Gt   CRj;t  
NX
i=1
i6=j
CRj;t
3775 ,
which we combine with (37), (38), and (40), in order to get,
xt+1 = (1 + rt+1) f[1  (N   1) R]xt   (1 + R + G) (1   t)Ytg . (44)
29
After combining (44) with (43) we obtain the law of motion xt+1 = X (xt), namely,
xt+1 =
1
1 + 1+R+G

[1  (N   1) R]xt . (45)
With (45) at hand we return to calculating the undetermined coe¢ cients ,  , , and
R. We substitute (42) into the Bellman equation given by (12) and get,
 +  
1X
s=t
s t ln (1 + rs+1) +   ln (xt) = l ln (1  L) + ln (L)
+ ln (1   t) + ln (zt) + G ln (Gt) + R ln
 
CRj;t

+  +  
1X
s=t+1
s t 1 ln (1 + rs+1) +  ln (xt+1) . (46)
After combining (37), (38), (43), and (45), we obtain,
l ln (1  L) + ln (L) + ln (1   t) + ln (zt) + G ln (Gt) + R ln
 
CRj;t

= G ln (G) + R ln (R)  (1 + G + R)

ln () + ln () + ln

1 +
1 + G + R


+ (1 + G + R) fln [1  (N   1) R] + ln (xt)g . (47)
In addition, equation (45) implies,
 ln (xt+1) =  ln (1 + rt+1)+

ln [1  (N   1) R] + ln (xt)  ln

1 +
1 + G + R


.
(48)
Substituting (48) and (47) into (46) leads to,
(1  )  = l ln (1  L) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)  (1 + G + R) ln ()
+ (1 + G + R + )

ln [1  (N   1) R]  ln

1 +
1 + G + R


+ (    ) ln (1 + rt+1) + [1 + G + R    (1  )] ln (xt) . (49)
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In order that the guessed functional forms given by (40) and (42) be indeed correct, equation
(49) should not depend on its two variables, xt and rt+1. Due to this requirement of non-
dependence of equation (49) on xt and rt+1, two immediate implications of (49) are,
 =
1 + G + R
1   , (50)
and  = , so, based on (50), we obtain,
 =
  (1 + G + R)
1   . (51)
Combining (43), (45), (37), and (50), we obtain,
Gt =
(1  ) G [1  (N   1) R]
1 + G + R
xt . (52)
Equations (52) and (38) imply,
CRj;t =
(1  ) R [1  (N   1) R]
1 + G + R
xt . (53)
Our guess (40) concerning the exploitation strategy of group j 2 f1; :::; Ng is CRj;t = Rxt.
So, combining (40) with (53) identies the undetermined coe¢ cient R,
R =
(1  ) R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R , (54)
which proves equation (17). Based on (54),
1  (N   1) R =
1 + G + R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R . (55)
Combining (52) and (54) proves equation (14). In addition, the budget-constraint equation
(18) is reconrmed by substituting (52) and (53) into (11), and after noticing that,
N   [1  (N   1) R] ,
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which proves formula (19). Equation (16) is proved directly from (37). Finally, after com-
bining (49) with (50), (51), (54), and (55), we can identify the last undetermined coe¢ cient,
, which is given by,
 =
1
1  
8><>:l ln (1  L) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)
+ (1 + G + R)


1   ln () + ln (1  ) +

1   ln (1 + G + R)

 1 + G + R
1   ln [1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R]
9>=>; , (56)
completing the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Interest-rate levels are determined by equating demand and supply of government bonds
in international markets. In particular, the demand for bonds one period ahead, Bt+1, is given
by equation (24). Bond supply is obtained by combining the optimal level of government
spending with the scal-budget constraint. From Proposition 1 (see equations (18) and (19)
for N = 1) we know that the supply of bonds in period t+ 1 is given by,
Bt+1 =  (1 + rt+1)Bt + (1 + rt+1)

(1  ) ztW
 frsg1s=t+1  Yt . (57)
After applying the equilibrium condition Bt+1 = Bt+1, and assuming also that Bt = B

t (no
default in any period), equations (57) and (24) imply,
W
 frsg1s=t+1 = L1   , t = 0; 1; ::: . (58)
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In the proof of Proposition 1 we have mentioned an easily veriable result, that the sequence
fWt+1g1t=0 corresponding to equation (15) satises the recursion given by (41). Specically,
the formula given by (15) is the solution to (41). After substituting (58) into (41), we
obtain the level of interest rate rss given by (26), and the implication that rt+1 = rss for all
t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
Equations (27), (28), and (29) are derived immediately after substituting rt+1 = rss for
all t 2 f0; 1; :::g into (18), (14), (16), and (17). In all cases we take into account that, under
cooperation, N = . Under cooperation, all formulas are considered as if N = 1 with the
sole exception that the aggregate rents of the coalition are equally shared among rent-seeking
groups, with each rent seeking group receiving CR;C (Bt; zt) =N . 
Proof of Proposition 3
Equating demand for bonds (equation (24)) and supply of bonds (equation (18)), together
with (10), leads to,
(   N) bt = (1  N)

Wt+1
L
  1
1  N

. (59)
From (41) it is,
Wt+2
L
=
1 + rt+1
1 + 

Wt+1
L
  1

. (60)
After considering equation (59) one period ahead and after substituting (60) into it, we
obtain,
(   N) bt+1 = (1  N)
1 + rt+1
1 + 

Wt+1
L
  1

  1 . (61)
After some algebra, equation (59) gives,
Wt+1
L
  1 = 1
1  N
[(   N) bt + N ] . (62)
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Substituting (62) into (61) gives,
(   N) bt+1 =
1 + rt+1
1 + 
[(   N) bt + N ]  1 . (63)
Equation (18) can be expressed as,
bt+1 =
 (1 + rt+1)
1 + 
bt , for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g . (64)
Substituting (64) into (63) gives two useful equations, a linear rst-order di¤erence equation
in variable 1=bt,
1
bt+1
=
N

 1
bt
+ (1  )

1  N


, (65)
and an equilibrium condition that links up bt directly with rt,
[(1  ) (   N) bt + N ]
1 + rt+1
1 + 
= 1 . (66)
The solution to (65) is,
1
bt
  (1  ) =

N

t 
1
b0
  (1  )

. (67)
Combining (66) and (67) leads to,
1
1 + ~rt+1
=
   N
1 +

N

t 
1
1   1b0   1
 + N , t = 0; 1; ::: , (68)
in which f~rsg1s=1 is the sequence of international-equilibrium interest rates.
With equation (68) at hand we can identify which b0 is possible or admissible, through
equating supply and demand for bonds in period 0. Recall from equation (15) that,
W1
L
=
W (f~rsg1s=1)
L
=
1Y
s=1
1
1 + ~rs
+ 1 +
1X
s=1
1
sQ
j=1
(1 + ~rj)
. (69)
A direct implication of equation (68) is that limt!1 ~rt = (1  ) =, and consequently,
1Y
s=1
1
1 + ~rs
= 0 , (70)
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which is the rst term of the right-hand side of (69). In particular, after incorporating (70)
and (68) into (69) we obtain,
W (f~rsg1s=1)
L
=
1
1  N
+
1X
s=1
sY
j=1
   N
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1b0   1
  F (b0) . (71)
In order to understand whether an equilibrium with default is possible in the case
of N  2, we examine which values of b0 are possible after equating supply with demand
for bonds in period 0. This market-clearing condition is obtained by substituting (71) into
equation (59), after setting t = 0 for the latter, which gives, (   N) b0 = (1  N)F (b0) 1,
or,
H (b0)     N
1  N
b0 +
1
1  N
= F (b0) . (72)
In order to nd solutions of (72) that reect bond-market clearing in period 0, it is helpful
to understand some properties of function F (b0). Let
f (b0; j)     N
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1b0   1
 . (73)
From (73) and (71),
F (b0) =
1
1  N
+
1X
s=1
sY
j=1
f (b0; j) > 0 , for all b0 2

0;
1
1  

. (74)
Since, for all b0 2 [0; 1= (1  )],
fb0 (b0; j) =
 N
1 

N

j 1

1 

N

j 1
b0 +
1
1 

N

j 12 > 0 , (75)
an implication of (74) and (75) is,
F 0 (b0) = fb0 (b0; 1) +
1X
s=2
sX
j=1
fb0 (b0; j)
sY
l=1
l6=j
f (b0; l) > 0 . (76)
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In addition,
F (0) =
1
1  N
= H (0) , (77)
since f (0; j) = 0 for all j 2 f1; 2; :::g,
F 0 (0) = (1  ) (   N) <
   N
1  N
= H 0 (0) , (78)
and
F

1
1  

=
1
1  N
+
   N
1  (   N)
<
1
1   = H

1
1  

. (79)
Equations (76), (77), (78), and (79) show that, as b0 spans the interval [0; 1= (1  )], (i)
function F (b0) starts from taking the value 1= (1  N), and satisfying the market-clearing
condition at b0 = 0, (ii) it continues in the neighborhood of b0 = 0 with slope which is lower
than the constant slope of H (b0), (F 0 (0) < H 0 (0)), meaning that F (b0) goes below function
H (b0) in the neighborhood of b0 = 0, (iii) F (b0) continues as a strictly increasing function
all the way up to 1= (1  ), and (iv) then at 1= (1  ), F (1= (1  )) < H (1= (1  )).
Investigating concavity/convexity properties of F (b0) is a cumbersome task with, perhaps
ambiguous results. Properties (i)-(iv) regarding the behavior of F (b0), reveal that, if F (b0)
was either globally concave or globally convex on the interval [0; 1= (1  )], then it would
be immediately proved that b0 = 0 (full default) would be the only value satisfying the
market-clearing condition F (b0) = H (b0). Since we do not have such a result at hand, we
prove that no solutions other than default are possible, proceeding by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists some ~b0 2 (0; 1= (1  )), such that,
F

~b0

= H

~b0

. (80)
From (65) we know that,
~b1 =
1
N

1
~b0
+ 
=
~b0

, (81)
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in which   (   N) (1  ) = and   N= + ~b0. Since ~b1 is on the equilibrium path,
it should also satisfy,
F

~b1

= H

~b1

. (82)
From (72) and (81) it is,
H

~b1

=
1

   N
1  N
~b0 +
1
1  N
,
and by substituting (81) into this last expression again, we obtain
H

~b1

  1
1  N
=
1


H

~b0

  1
1  N

=
1


F

~b0

  1
1  N

= F

~b1

  1
1  N
,
(83)
an implication of (80) and (82). From (71) it is,
F

~b1

  1
1  N
=
1X
s=1
sY
j=1
   N
1 +

N

j 1 
 1
1   1~b0   1
 ,
and (83) implies,
1X
s=1
sY
j=1
   N
1 +

N

j 1 
 1
1   1~b0   1
 = 1

1X
s=1
sY
j=1
   N
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1~b0   1
 . (84)
Subtracting the right-hand-side of (84) from the left-hand side and rearranging terms,
1X
s=1
(   N)s
  1

sY
j=1
264 1
1 +

N

j 1 
 1
1   1~b0   1
   1
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1~b0   1

375 = 0 ,
or,
  1

1X
s=1
(   N)s (1  )s

sY
j=1

N

j 1
1
1 
1
~b0
1 +

N

j 1 
 1
1   1~b0   1
 
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1~b0   1
 = 0 . (85)
37
From (81) we know that
 =
~b0
~b1
, (86)
and from (64) it is,
~b0
~b1
=
1

1
1 + ~r1
. (87)
Yet, it is veriable from (68) that for all ~b0 < 1= (1  ),
~r1 > ~r
ss , 1

1
1 + ~r1
<
1

1
1 + ~rss
= 1 . (88)
Combining (88) with (87) and (86) implies,
0 <  < 1 . (89)
Inequality (89) implies that the left-hand side of (85) is the product of a negative term,
(  1) =, and an innite summation of strictly positive terms, contradicting (85). Since
the choice of ~b0 2 (0; 1= (1  )) was arbitrary, the possibility that N  2 and positive
outstanding scal debt is ruled out.
Therefore, b0 = 0 is the only admissible solution. To see that b0 = 0 is admissible, notice
that (64) implies bt = 0 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, so F (bt = 0) = H (bt = 0) is always satised.
To sum up, if N  2, domestic governments will default. After the default, all future
governments will optimally cease the issuing of public decit. This optimal behavior in our
model is demonstrated by equation (64). 
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Denition of aMarkov-perfect-cooperation-decision Nash equilibrium (MPCDNE)
Let the cooperation decision of rent-seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng be denoted by the
indicator function
Ij;t =
8><>: 1 ;0 ;
j plays cooperatein period t
j plays do not cooperatein period t
.
Let the rent-consumption strategies in periods of no cooperation be denoted by CR;NCj for
all j 2 f1; :::; Ng. Let
S 
n
CR;NCi ; Ii
oN
i=1
,
and two Bellman equations, one related to determining the value of a cooperation decision
in the current period,
V C;j (B; z j S) = max
(;CR;C ;B0)
(
ln (zL) + ln (1  ) + l ln (1  L) + R ln

CR;C
N

+ G ln

B0
1 +R (B; z j S)  
 
B + CR;C   zL
+ 

NQ
i=1
Ii (B0; (1 + ) z j S)V C;j (B0; (1 + ) z j S)
+

1 
NQ
i=1
Ii (B0; (1 + ) z j S)

V NC;j (B0; (1 + ) z j S)

, (90)
and one related to determining the value of a noncooperation decision in the current period,
V NC;j (B; z j S) = max
(;cR;NCj ;B0)
(
ln (zL) + ln (1  ) + l ln (1  L) + R ln

cR;NCj

+ G ln
24 B0
1 +R (B; z j S)  
0@B + CR;C + cR;NCj + NP
i=1
i6=j
CR;NCi (B; z j S)  zL
1A35
+ 

NQ
i=1
Ii (B0; (1 + ) z j S)V C;j (B0; (1 + ) z j S)
+

1 
NQ
i=1
Ii (B0; (1 + ) z j S)

V NC;j (B0; (1 + ) z j S)

. (91)
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Denition B.1 focuses on global cooperation among N rent-seeking groups, excluding coop-
erating subcoalitions. In the application of this paper we focus on a symmetric equilibrium
of the case with N = 2, i.e., subcoalitions are impossible.
Denition B.1 AMarkov-Perfect-Cooperation-Decision Nash Equilibrium (MPCDNE)
is a set of strategies, S 
n
CR;NCi ; Ii
oN
i=1
of the form CR;NCi;t = C
R;NC
i (Bt; zt j S)
Ii;t = Ii (Bt; zt j S) with
Ii (Bt; zt j S) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1 ;
0 ;
if V C;j (B; z j S)  V NC;j (B; z j S) and
NQ
j=1
j 6=i
Ij (Bt; zt j S) = 1
if V C;j (B; z j S) < V NC;j (B; z j S) and
NQ
j=1
j 6=i
Ij (Bt; zt j S) = 1 ,
or if
NQ
j=1
j 6=i
Ij (Bt; zt j S) = 0
and a set of policy decision rules (T;G;B) of the form,
 t = T (Bt; zt j S) =
NQ
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)TC (Bt; zt j S)
+

1 
NQ
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)

TNC (Bt; zt j S) ,
Bt+1 = B (Bt; zt j S) =
NQ
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)BC (Bt; zt j S)
+

1 
NQ
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)

BNC (Bt; zt j S) ,
Gt = G (Bt; zt j S) =
NQ
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)GC (Bt; zt j S)
+

1 
NQ
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)

GNC (Bt; zt j S) ,
a bond-supply strategy of creditors, Bt+1 = B (Bt; zt j S), and an interest-rate
rule, RNC (Bt; zt j S), such that

TNC ;BNC ;CR;NCj ;GNC

guarantee that each
and every rent seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng solves the Bellman equation given
40
by (91),
 
TC ;BC ;CR;C ;GC

solves the Bellman equation given by (90), credi-
tors Bcomplies with equation (24), and with RNC (Bt; zt j S) = rt+1 satisfying
B (Bt; zt j S) = B (Bt; zt j S), for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
With this denition at hand, we proceed to formally proving Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4
In order to calculate V C;j (Bt; zt) we substitute the results stated by Propositions 1 and
2 into the Bellman equation given by (12), after taking into account that the total rents of
the coalition are divided by 2, which implies that we must subtract R ln (2) = (1  ). In the
proof of Proposition 1 we have already achieved most of this calculation as we have obtained
the expressions for ,  , and  (c.f. equations (56), (51), and (50), which correspond
to the value function given by (42)). From equation (26) in Proposition 2 we know that
Wt=L = 1= (1  ) for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, so V C;j (Bt; zt) becomes,
V C;j (Bt; zt) =
1
1  
(
 R ln (2) + l ln (1  L) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)
+ (1 + G + R)

 ln (1 + )
1   + ln (1  )  ln (1 + G + R)

+(1 + G + R) ln

ztL
1    Bt

. (92)
In order to calculate V NC;j
 
Bt = 0; zt j
n
CR;NCi
o2
i=1
i6=j
!
we nd the static-equilibrium non-
cooperative solution for N = 2, and calculate the discounted sum of lifetime utility of each
group. So,
V NC;j
 
Bt = 0; zt j
n
CR;NCi
o2
i=1
i6=j
!
=
1
1  
(
l ln (1  L) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)
+ (1 + G + R) [ln (L)  ln (1 + G + 2R)]
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+(1 + G + R)

 ln (1 + )
1   + ln (zt)

. (93)
Comparing (92) with (93) leads to the cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio in (33).
In order to verify that the cases in which (i) the two rent-seeking groups never cooperate,
(ii) the two rent-seeking groups cooperate forever, are both Markov-Perfect-Cooperation-
Decision Nash Equilibrium (MPCDNE), notice that, by denition B.1, (i) can be aMPCDNE,
no matter what bt might be. From Proposition 3 we know that if rent-seeking groups never
cooperate, then bt = 0 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, which still allows (i) to be an MPCDNE. To see
that (ii) is also an MPCDNE, notice that, as long as (33) holds in period 0, then Proposition
2 (c.f. eq. 27) implies bt = b0, so (33) holds for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g. So, rent-seeking groups
cooperating forever is an MPCDNE, as a direct consequence of Denition B.1. 
Proof of Proposition 5
In order to derive b, notice that
gNCdefault =
G
1 + G + 2R
=

1 + 
G
R
, (94)
and that (28) implies,
gC
b^
=
G
R

h
1  (1  ) b^
i
. (95)
Comparing (94) with (95) gives,
gC
b^
 gNCdefault , b^ 
1
1  

1 + 
,
proving (34), (35), and (36). To show that b > b, use (34) and (33),
b > b, 2 > 1 ,
which is a true statement, proving the proposition. 
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Proof that calibrating R and G in order to match target values for the government-
consumption-GDP ratio and the total-rents-GDP ratio is independent from the
values of  at the cuto¤ level b
Let g denote the government-consumption-GDP ratio G=Y at the cuto¤ debt-GDP b,
and let cR denote the total-rents-GDP ratio at the cuto¤ debt-GDP b. Substituting the
formula given by (33) for b into (28), we obtain,
g =
G
R
 [1  (1  ) b] = G
R
2
1 + 
, (96)
in which  is given by (32). Equation (29) implies,
cR
g
=
R
G
) G = R
g
cR
. (97)
Using (97), we can express (96) as a function of parameter R alone, obtaining,
g =
R
g
cR
1 + R(1 +
g
cR
)
2
R
1+R(1+
g
cR
)
1 + R
1+R(1+
g
cR
)
. (98)
Using (98) together with target calibration values for g and cR, we can nd the specic value
of parameter R by solving the nonlinear equation
f (R) = 0 ,
in which
f (R) 
R
g
cR
1 + R(1 +
g
cR
)
2
R
1+R(1+
g
cR
)
1 + R
1+R(1+
g
cR
)
  g . (99)
From (99) we can see that matching target calibration values for g and cR is independent
from values of . Finally, from (97), G = 

Rg=cR. 
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Figure 1 Correlation between the fiscal-surplus/GDP ratio (in percentage points) and the Corruption-Perceptions Index (CPI) for Euro zone
countries (t-statistics in parentheses). For Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia averages are calculated since four years prior to
joining the Euro zone. Sources: Eurostat, Transparency International.
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Corruption and External Sovereign 
Debt Inter-linkages in Eurozone 
Countries  
 
Figure S.1 depicts the evolution of external sovereign debt in years 2003, 2006, and 2009, a 
year before the sovereign-debt crisis broke out in the Eurozone. Figure S.1 corroborates 
that, perhaps due to the currency union, Eurozone countries continued to issue external 
debt, as the Eurozone banking system facilitated the exchange of sovereign bonds among 
Eurozone commercial banks. 
That commercial banks had incentives to buy sovereign bonds of periphery Eurozone 
countries is corroborated by Figure S.2.  Figure S.2 depicts the evolution of 10-year 
sovereign-bond returns in Eurozone-periphery countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and 
Ireland) versus Germany, before the entrance to the Eurozone and after the start of the 
sovereign-debt crisis. All countries that had high interest-rate spreads compared to Germany 
before entrance to the Eurozone suffer chronically from corruption, according to the 
Corruption Perceptions Index survey. Table S.1 shows that Greece, Portugal, Italy, and 
Spain, have been scoring low according to the Corruption Perceptions Index survey 
throughout the years 1995-2010. The fact that the pre-Eurozone sovereign spreads of these 
countries vanished rapidly and persistently between years 2001-2008, indicates that 
Eurozone creditors (including commercial banks) in Eurozone-core countries, bought 
substantial amounts of sovereign debt. According to Figure S.1, the external debt of Greece, 
Portugal, Italy and Spain, rose sharply between years 2003-2009, and placed these 
countries among the top external-sovereign-debt issuers in the world (highest debt-GDP 
ratios). The key message from Figure S.2 is that countries with high corruption had high 
sovereign-debt spreads before entering the Eurozone and afterwards, during the sovereign-
debt crisis. Ireland, which exhibits low corruption, had sovereign-debt problems only during 
the sovereign-debt crisis, most likely due to its post-Lehman-Brothers banking crisis, which 
was combined with a domestic real-estate price drop. 
In brief, external sovereign debt of EU periphery countries grew rapidly in the 2000s (Figure 
S.1), speculating that commercial banks in Eurozone-core countries may have been the 
main buyer of periphery sovereign debt as indicated by dynamics of 10-year-bond returns 
before and after the introduction of the Euro (Figure S.2). Euro area commercial banks 
typically hold a diversified portfolio of government bonds of several union countries and thus 
can be severely affected by a default through losses on these bonds. Bolton and Jeanne 
(2011) provide information on Euro area commercial banks foreign debt exposures as of 
2010.  
The overarching element before the introduction of the Euro and after the sovereign crisis 
broke out, distinguishing core versus periphery countries in the Eurozone, is that the latter 
countries always had more corruption (Table S.1). Although our framework does not 
explicitly model banks, we use corruption and rent seeking as the main driver of 
developments after the crisis, and we provide insights concerning the political sustainability 
of bailout plans. First, we speculate that corruption and rent seeking was responsible for 
having high spreads in high-corruption EU countries before the introduction of the Euro 
(cheap bonds due to inflationary expectations). Second, we speculate that the low prices of 
sovereign bonds in high-corruption countries made these bonds attractive for arbitrage by 
banks in low-corruption Eurozone countries in the 2000s, increasing the external sovereign 
debt of high-corruption Eurozone countries dramatically. Third, since high-corruption 
countries held high external debt during the subprime crisis period, some consequences of 
sovereign default could be transmitted abroad, making the possibility of default higher, and 
leading bond spreads to rise dramatically (see Figure S.2). Yet, the risk of financial 
contagion in the Eurozone may be high, motivating bailout-package initiatives. Such a rough 
outline of causes and effects of the sovereign crisis in the Eurozone is what motivated us to 
focus our model on the interplay between external debt and corruption in order to study the 
political sustainability of fiscal targets set by rescue packages. 
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Figure S.2 -- Source: European Central Bank and European Commission, secondary market 
yields of government bonds with maturities close to 10 years. Numbers appearing in 
parenthesis in front of every country’s name is the ranking according to the Corruption 
Perception Index 2010 from Transparency International (higher ranking means lower 
corruption). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
0
5
10
15
20
25
19
93
Ja
n
19
93
Ju
l
19
94
Ja
n
19
94
Ju
l
19
95
Ja
n
19
95
Ju
l
19
96
Ja
n
19
96
Ju
l
19
97
Ja
n
19
97
Ju
l
19
98
Ja
n
19
98
Ju
l
19
99
Ja
n
19
99
Ju
l
20
00
Ja
n
20
00
Ju
l
20
01
Ja
n
20
01
Ju
l
20
02
Ja
n
20
02
Ju
l
20
03
Ja
n
20
03
Ju
l
20
04
Ja
n
20
04
Ju
l
20
05
Ja
n
20
05
Ju
l
20
06
Ja
n
20
06
Ju
l
20
07
Ja
n
20
07
Ju
l
20
08
Ja
n
20
08
Ju
l
20
09
Ja
n
20
09
Ju
l
20
10
Ja
n
20
10
Ju
l
20
11
Ja
n
Germany (15) Spain (30) Greece (68)
Ireland (14) Italy (67) Portugal (32)
Secondary market yields of government bonds with maturities close to 10 years 
and corruption ranking  according to Corruption Perception Index 2010
 Table S.1 -- Corruption Perception Index 
 
Country 
1995  1998  2003  2005  2008  2010 
Score ( Ranking ) 
Ireland  8.57 (10)  8.2 (14)  7.5 (18)  7.4 (19)  7.7 (16)  8.0 (14) 
Germany  8.14 (11)  7.9 (15)  7.7 (16)  8.2 (16)  7.9 (14)  7.9 (15) 
Spain  4.35 (24)  6.1 (23)  6.9 (23)  7.0 (23)  6.5(28)  6.1 (30) 
Portugal  5.56 (20)  6.5(22)  6.6 (25)  6.5 (26)  6.1 (32)  6.0 (32) 
Italy  2.99 (31)  4.6 (39)  5.3 (35)  5.0 (40)  4.8 (55)  3.9 (67) 
Greece  4.04 (28)  4.9 (36)  4.3 (50)  4.3 (47)  4.7 (57)  3.5 (68) 
Best‐worst score  9.55‐1.94  10‐1.4  9.7‐1.3  9.7‐1.7  9.3‐1.0  9.3‐1.1 
 
Source: Transparency International 
Note: Higher score means lower corruption and numbers appearing in parentheses next 
to each score is the country’s world-corruption raking based on the score in each 
particular year. 
 
 
